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Abstract
We introduce RiffleScrambler: a new family of directed acyclic graphs
and a corresponding data-independent memory hard function with pass-
word independent memory access. We prove its memory hardness in the
random oracle model.
RiffleScrambler is similar to Catena – updates of hashes are determined
by a graph (bit-reversal or double-butterfly graph in Catena). The advan-
tage of the RiffleScrambler over Catena is that the underlying graphs are
not predefined but are generated per salt, as in Balloon Hashing. Such
an approach leads to higher immunity against practical parallel attacks.
RiffleScrambler offers better efficiency than Balloon Hashing since the in-
degree of the underlying graph is equal to 3 (and is much smaller than
in Ballon Hashing). At the same time, because the underlying graph is
an instance of a Superconcentrator, our construction achieves the same
time-memory trade-offs.
Keywords: Memory hardness, password storing, key derivation function,
Markov chains, mixing time, Thorp shuffle.
1 Introduction
In early days of computers’ era passwords were stored in plaintext in the form
of pairs (user, password). Back in 1960s it was observed, that it is not secure.
It took around a decade to incorporate a more secure way of storing users’
passwords – via a DES-based function crypt, as (user, fk(password)) for a
secret key k or as (user, f(password)) for a one-way function. The first approach
(with encrypting passwords) allowed admins to learn a user password while both
methods enabled to find two users with the same password. To mitigate that
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problem, a random salt was added and in most systems, passwords are stored as
(user, f(password, salt), salt) for a one-way function f . This way, two identical
passwords will with high probability be stored as two different strings (since the
salt should be chosen uniformly at random).
Then another issue appeared: an adversary, having a database of hashed
passwords, can try many dictionary-based passwords or a more targeted at-
tack [WZW+16]. The ideal password should be random, but users tend to select
passwords with low entropy instead. Recently, a probabilistic model of the dis-
tribution of choosing passwords, based on Zipf’s law was proposed [WCW+17].
That is why one requires password-storing function to be “slow” enough to
compute for an attacker and “fast” enough to compute for the authenticating
server.
To slow-down external attackers two additional enhancements were pro-
posed. Pepper is similar to salt, its value is sampled from uniform distribution
and passwords are stored as (user, f(password, salt, pepper), salt) but the value
of pepper is not stored – evaluation (and guessing) of a password is slowed down
by the factor equal to the size of the space from which pepper is chosen. Garlic
is also used to slow down the process of verifying a password – it tells how many
times f is called, a password is stored as (user, fgarlic(password, salt, pepper), salt, garlic).
Using pepper and garlic has one bottleneck – it slows down at the same rate
both an attack and the legitimate server. Moreover this approach does not
guarantee required advantage over an adversary who can evaluate a function
simultaneously using ASICs (Application Specific Integrated Circuit) or clus-
ters of GPUs. The reason is that the cost of evaluation of hash functions like
SHA-1, SHA-2 on an ASIC is even several thousands times smaller than on a
CPU. For instance Antminer S9 has claimed performance of 14 TH/s [ant] (dou-
ble SHA256) versus about 30 GH/s for the best currently available GPU cards
(GeForce GTX 1080TI, Radeon RX Vega 56) and up to 1 GH/s for CPUs. Per-
cival [Per] noted that memory cost is more comparable across various platforms
than computation time. He suggested a memory-hard functions (MHF) and
introduced scrypt [Per]. So the right approach in designing a password-storing
function is not only to make a function slow, but to make it use relatively large
amounts of memory.
One can think about an MHF as a procedure of evaluating a function
F which uses some ordering of memory calls. Such a function can be de-
scribed as a DAG (Directed Acyclic Graph) G = GF . Vertex v represents
some internal value, and if evaluating this value requires values at vi1 , . . . , viM ,
then vi1 , . . . , viM are parents of v in G. For example, calculating a function
F = HN (x) = H(. . . H(H(x)) . . .) (H computed N times – like PBKDF2 –
Password Based Key Derivation Function 2 [Bur00] where N = 1024) can be
represented by a graph G = (V,E) with vertices {v0, v1, . . . , vN−1, vN} and
edges E = {(vi, vi+1), i = 0, . . . , N − 1} (i.e., a path). Initially, the value at
vertex v0 is x, computations yield in value F (x) at vertex vN .
We can categorize MHFs into two groups: data dependent MHFs (dMHF)
and data independent MHFs (iMHF). Roughly speaking, for iMHFs the order of
computations (graphGF ) does not depend on a password (but it can still depend
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on a salt), whereas the ordering of calculations in dMHFs depends on data (i.e.,
a password). Because dMHFs may be susceptible to various side-channel attacks
(via e.g., timing attacks, memory access pattern) the main focus is on designing
iMHFs.
Sequential vs Parallel attacks. Security of memory-hard functions can be
analyzed in two models: sequential one and parallel one. In the sequential
model, an adversary tries to invert a function by performing computation on
a single-core machine while in the parallel model an adversary may use many
processors to achieve its goal. The security of a given memory-hard function
comes from the properties of the underlying graphs, e.g., if an underlying graph
is a Superconcentrator (see Definition 3) then a function is memory-hard in the
sequential model while if the underlying graph is depth-robust then the function
is memory-hard in the parallel model.
1.1 Related Work
To compare various constructions, besides iMHF and dMHF distinction, one
considers the complexity of evaluation of a given function. The formal definitions
of sequential/parallel complexity are stated in Section 2 (and are formalized as a
pebble-game), here we provide the intuitive motivation behind these definitions.
The sequential complexity Πst(G) of a directed acyclic graph G is the time it
takes to label (pebble/evaluate) the graph times the maximal number of memory
cells the best sequential algorithm needs to evaluate (pebble) the graph. In the
similar fashion one defines cumulative complexity of parallel pebbling Π
||
cc(G)
of G, here this is the sum of the number of used memory cells during labeling
(pebbling) the graph by the best parallel algorithm. For detailed discussion on
the pebbling game see e.g. [AS15, BCGS16, FLW, LT82].
For a graph that corresponds to evaluating PBKDF2 above values are equal
to Πst(PBKDF2) = n and Π
||
cc(PBKDF2) = n while if a function is memory
hard Πst(PBKDF2) = Ω(n
2).
The Password Hashing Competition [phc] was announced in 2013 in the
quest of a standard function in the area. Argon2i [BDK16] was the winner,
while Catena [FLW15], Lyra2 [SAA+], yescript [yes14] and Makwa [Por15]
were given a special recognition.
Let DFGλn be the Catena Dragonfly Graph, BFG
λ
n be the Catena Butterfly
Graph (see [ABP17, FLW15]) and BHGλσ be the graph corresponding to evalu-
ating Balloon Hashing [BCGS16].
Concerning sequential attacks for DFGλN and BHG
λ
σ we have:
Lemma 1. Any adversary using S ≤ N/20 memory cells requires T placements
such that
T ≥ N
(
λN
64S
)λ
for DFGλN .
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Lemma 2. Any adversary using S ≤ N/64 memory cells, for in-degree δ = 7
and λ rounds requires
T ≥ (2
λ − 1)N2
32S
placements for BHGλσ.
Concerning parallel attacks for BFGλn, DFG
n
λ and BHG
λ
σ we have the following
Theorem 1 (Theorem 7 in [ABP17]). • If λ, n ∈ N+ such that n = 2g(λ(2g−
1) + 1) for some g ∈ N+ then
Π||cc(BFG
λ
n) = Ω
(
n1.5
g
√
gλ
)
• If λ, n ∈ N+ such that k = n/(λ+ 1) is a power of 2 then
Π||cc(DFG
λ
n) = Ω
(
n1.5√
λ
)
• If τ, σ ∈ N+ such that n = σ · τ then with high probability
Π||cc(BHG
σ
τ ) = Ω
(
n1.5√
τ
)
Alwen and Blocki [AB16] show that it is possible (in parallel setting) that
an attacker may save space for any iMHF (e.g., Argon2i, Balloon, Catena,
etc.) so the Π
||
cc is not Ω(n2) but Ω(n2/logn). The attack is applicable only
when the instance of an MHF requires large amount of memory (e.g., > 1GB)
while in practice, MHFs would be run so the memory consumption is of the
order of just several megabytes (e.g., 16MB). In order to mount such an attack,
a special-purpose hardware must be built (with lots of shared memory and
many cores). While Alwen, Blocki and Pietrzak [ABP17] improve these attacks
even further, it was still unclear if this type of attack is of practical concern.
But recently Alwen and Blocki [AB17] improved these attacks even more and
presented implementation which e.g., successfully ran against the latest version
of Argon (Argon2i-B).
1.2 Our contribution
In this paper (details given in Section 3) we introduce RiffleScrambler – a new
family of directed acyclic graphs and a corresponding data-independent memory
hard function with password independent memory access. We prove its memory
hardness in the random oracle model.
For a password x, a salt s and security parameters (integers) g, λ:
1. a permutation ρ = ρg(s) of N = 2
g elements is generated using (time
reversal of) Riffle Shuffle (see Algorithm 1) and
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2. a computation graph RSGNλ = Gλ,g,s = Gλ,g(ρ) is generated.
Evaluation of RiffleScrambler (a function on 2λ stacked RSGN graphs) with
S = N = 2g memory cells takes the number of steps proportional to T ≈ 3λN
(the max-indegree of the graph is equal to 3).
Our result on time-memory trade-off concerning sequential attacks is following.
Lemma 3. Any adversary using S ≤ N/20 memory cells requires T placements
such that
T ≥ N
(
λN
64S
)λ
for the RSGNλ .
The above lemma means that (in the sequential model) any adversary who
uses S memory cells for which S ≤ N/20 would spend at least T steps evalu-
ating the function and T ≥ N ( λN64S )λ (the punishment for decreasing available
memory cells is severe). The result for sequential model gives the same level as
for Catena (see Lemma 1) while it is much better than for BallonHashing (see
Lemma 2). The main advantage of RiffleScrambler (compared to Catena) is that
each salt corresponds (with high probability) to a different computation graph,
and there are N ! = 2g! of them (while Catena uses one, e.g., bit-reversal based
graph). Moreover it is easy to modify RiffleScrambler so the number of possible
computation graphs is equal to N !2λ = (2g!)2λ (we can use different – also salt
dependent – permutations in each stack).
On the other hand RiffleScrambler guarantees better immunity against par-
allel attacks than Catena’s computation graph. Our result concerning parallel
attacks is following.
Lemma 4. For positive integers λ, g let n = 2g(2λg + 1) for some g ∈ N+.
Then
Π||cc(RSG
k
λ) = Ω
(
n1.5√
gλ
)
.
The RiffleScrambler is a password storing method that is immune to cache-
timing attacks since memory access pattern is password-independent.
2 Preliminaries
For a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V,E) of n = |V | nodes, we say that
the indegree is δ = maxv∈V indeg(v) if δ is the smallest number such that for
any v ∈ V the number of incoming edges is not larger than δ. Parents of a node
v ∈ V is the set parentsG(v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}.
We say that u ∈ V is a source node if it has no parents (has indegree 0) and
we say that u ∈ V is a sink node if it is not a parent for any other node (it
has 0 outdegree). We denote the set of all sinks of G by sinks(G) = {v ∈ V :
outdegree(v) = 0}.
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The directed path p = (v1, . . . , vt) is of length t in G if (∀i)vi ∈ V , (vi, vi+1) ∈
E, we denote it by length(p) = t. The depth d = depth(G) of a graph G is the
length of the longest directed path in G.
2.1 Pebbling and complexity
One of the methods for analyzing iMHFs is to use so called pebbling game. We
will follow [ABP17] with the notation (see also therein for more references on
pebbling games).
Definition 1 (Parallel/Sequential Graph Pebbling). Let G = (V,E) be a DAG
and let T ⊂ V be a target set of nodes to be pebbled. A pebbling configura-
tion (of G) is a subset Pi ⊂ V . A legal parallel pebbling of T is a sequence
P = (P0, . . . , Pt) of pebbling configurations of G, where P0 = ∅ and which sat-
isfies conditions 1 and 2 below. A sequential pebbling additionally must satisfy
condition 3.
1. At some step every target node is pebbled (though not necessarily simulta-
neously).
∀x ∈ T ∃z ≤ t : x ∈ Pz.
2. Pebbles are added only when their predecessors already have a pebble at
the end of the previous step.
∀i ∈ [t] : x ∈ (Pi \ Pi−1)⇒ parents(x) ⊂ Pi−1.
3. At most one pebble is placed per step.
∀i ∈ [t] : |Pi \ Pi−1| ≤ 1.
We denote with PG,T and P ||G,T the set of all legal sequential and parallel peb-
blings of G with target set T , respectively.
Note that PG,T ⊂ P ||G,T . The most interesting case is when T = sinks(G),
with such a T we write PG and P ||G.
Definition 2 (Time/Space/Cumulative Pebbling Complexity). The time, space,
space-time and cumulative complexity of a pebbling P = {P0, . . . , Pt} ∈ P ||G are
defined as:
Πt(P ) = t, Πs(P ) = max
i∈[t]
|Pi|, Πst(P ) = Πt(P )·Πs(P ), Πcc(P ) =
∑
i∈[t]
|Pi|.
For α ∈ {s, t, st, cc} and a target set T ⊂ V , the sequential and parallel pebbling
complexities of G are defined as
Πα(G, T ) = min
P∈PG,T
Πα(P ), Π
||
α(G, T ) = min
P∈P
||
G,T
Πα(P ).
When T = sinks(G) we write Πα(G) and Π
||
α(G).
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2.2 Tools for sequential attacks
Definition 3 (N -Superconcentrator). A directed acyclic graph G = 〈V,E〉 with
a set of vertices V and a set of edges E, a bounded indegree, N inputs, and N
outputs is called N-Superconcentrator if for every k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ N and
for every pair of subsets V1 ⊂ V of k inputs and V2 ⊂ V of k outputs, there are
k vertex-disjoint paths connecting the vertices in V1 to the vertices in V2.
By stacking λ (an integer) N -Superconcentrators we obtain a graph called
(N, λ)-Superconcentrator.
Definition 4 ((N, λ)-Superconcentrator). Let Gi, i = 0, . . . , λ−1 be N -Superconcentrators.
Let G be the graph created by joining the outputs of Gi to the corresponding in-
puts of Gi+1, i = 0, . . . , λ− 2. Graph G is called (N, λ)-Superconcentrator.
Theorem 2 (Lower bound for a (N, λ)-Superconcentrator [LT82]). Pebbling a
(N, λ)-Superconcentrator using S ≤ N/20 pebbles requires T placements such
that
T ≥ N
(
λN
64S
)λ
.
2.3 Tools for parallel attacks
We build upon the results from [ABP17], hence we shall recall the definitions
used therein.
Definition 5 (Depth-Robustness [ABP17]). For n ∈ N and e, d ∈ [n] a DAG
G = (V,E) is (e, d)-depth-robust if
∀S ⊂ V |S| ≤ e⇒ depth(G− S) ≥ d.
For (e, d)-depth-robust graph we have
Theorem 3 (Thm. 4 [ABP17]). Let G be an (e, d)-depth-robust DAG. Then
we have Π
||
cc(G) > ed.
We can obtain better bounds on Π
||
cc(G) having more assumptions on the
structure of G.
Definition 6 (Dependencies [ABP17]). Let G = (V,E) be a DAG and L ⊆
V . We say that L has a (z, g)−dependency if there exist nodes-disjoint paths
p1, . . . , pz of length at least g each ending in L.
Definition 7 (Dispersed Graph [ABP17]). Let g ≥ k be positive integers. A
DAG G is called (g, k)−dispersed if there exists ordering of its nodes such that
the following holds. Let [k] denote last k nodes in the ordering of G and let
Lj = [jg, (j + 1)g − 1] be the jth subinterval. Then ∀j ∈ [⌊k/g⌋] the interval Lj
has a (g, g)−dependency. More generally, let ε ∈ (0, 1]. If each interval Lj only
has an (εg, g)−dependency, then G is called (ε, g, k)-dispersed.
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Definition 8 (Stacked Dispersed Graphs [ABP17]). A DAG G ∈ Dλ,kε,g if there
exist λ ∈ N+ disjoint subsets of nodes {Li ⊆ V }, each of size k, with the
following two properties:
1. For each Li there is a path running through all nodes of Li.
2. Fix any topological ordering of nodes of G. For each i ∈ [λ] let Gi be the
sub-graph of G containing all nodes of G up to the last node of Li. Then
Gi is an (ε, g, k)−dispersed graph.
For stacked dispersed graphs we have
Theorem 4 (Thm. 4 in [ABP17]). Let G be a DAG such that G ∈ Dλ,kε,g . Then
we have
Π||cc(G) ≥ ελg(
k
2
− g).
3 Riffle Scrambler
The RiffleScrambler function uses the following parameters:
• s is a salt which is used to generate a graph G,
• g - garlic, G = 〈V,E〉, i.e., V = V0 ∪ . . . ∪ V2λg, |Vi| = 2g,
• λ - is the number of layers of the graph G.
Let HW (x) denote the Hamming weight of a binary string x (i.e., the num-
ber of ones in x), and x¯ denotes a coordinate-wise complement of x (thusHW (x¯)
denotes number of zeros in x).
Definition 9. Let B = (b0 . . . bn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n (a binary word of length n). We
define a rank rB(i) of a bit i in B as
rB(i) = |{j < i : bj = bi}|.
Definition 10 (Riffle-Permutation). Let B = (b0 . . . bn−1) be a binary word of
length n. A permutation pi induced by B is defined as
piB(i) =
{
rB(i) if bi = 0,
rB(i) +HW (B¯) if bi = 1
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Example 1. Let B = 11100100, then rB(0) = 0, rB(1) = 1, rB(2) = 2,
rB(3) = 0, rB(4) = 1, rB(5) = 3, rB(6) = 2, rB(7) = 3. The Riffle-Permutation
induced by B is equal to piB =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 5 6 0 1 7 2 3
)
. For graphical
illustration of this example see Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: A graph of Riffle-Permutation induced by B = 11100100.
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Figure 2: An 8-Single-Layer-Riffle-Graph (with horizontal edges and edge
(v07 , v
1
0) skipped) for B = 11100100. Permutation piB is depicted with solid
lines, whereas piB¯ is presented with dashed lines.
Definition 11 (N -Single-Layer-Riffle-Graph). Let V = V0 ∪ V1 where V i =
{vi0, . . . , viN−1} and let B be an N -bit word. Let piB be a Riffle-Permutation
induced by B.We define N -Single-Layer-Riffle-Graph (for even N) via the set
of edges E:
• 1 edge: v0N−1 → v10 ,
• N edges: v0i → v1piB(i) for i = 0, . . . , N − 1,
• N edges: v0i → v1piB¯(i) for i = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Example 2. Continuing with B and piB from Example 1, the 8-Single-Layer-
Riffle-Graph is presented in Fig. 2.
Algorithm 3 is responsible for generating an N -Double-Riffle-Graph which
is defined in the following way. From now on, we assume that N = 2g.
Definition 12 (N -Double-Riffle-Graph). Let V denote the set of vertices and
E be the set of edges of G = (V,E). Let B0, . . . , Bg−1 be g binary words of the
length 2g each. Then N -Double-Riffle-Graph is obtained by stacking 2g Single-
Layer-Riffle-Graphs resulting in a graph consisting of (2g + 1)2g vertices
• {v00 , . . . , v02g−1} ∪ . . . ∪ {v2g0 , . . . , v2g2g−1},
and edges:
• (2g + 1)2g edges: vji−1 → vji for i ∈ {1, . . . , 2g − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2g},
• 2g edges: vj2g−1 → vj+10 for j ∈ {0, . . . , 2g − 1},
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• g2g edges: vj−1i → vjpiBj (i) for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2
g − 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , g},
• g2g edges: vj−1i → vjpiB¯j (i) for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2
g − 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , g},
and the following edges for the lower g layers – which are symmetric with respect
to the level g (and where we use inverse of permutations induced by Bj , j ∈
{0, . . . , g − 1}):
• g2g edges: v2g−j
pi
−1
Bj
(i)
→ v2g−j+1i → for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2g − 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , g},
• g2g edges: v2g−ji → v2g−j+1pi−1
Bj
(i)
for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2g − 1}, j ∈ {1, . . . , g}.
Definition 13 ((N, λ)-Double-Riffle-Graph). Let Gi, i = 0, . . . , λ − 1 be N -
Double-Riffle-Graphs. The (N, λ)-Double-Riffle-Graph is a graph obtained by
stacking λ times N -Double-Riffle-Graphs together by joining outputs of Gi to
the corresponding inputs of Gi+1, i = 0, . . . , λ− 2.
One of the ingredients of our main procedure is a construction of (N, λ)-
Double-Riffle-Graph using specific binary words B0, . . . , Bg−1. To continue,
we have to introduce ”trajectory tracing“. For given σ – a permutation of
{0, . . . , 2g − 1} – let B be a binary matrix of size 2g × g, whose j-th row is
a binary representation of σ(j), j = 0, . . . , 2g− 1. Denote by Bi the i-th column
of B, i.e., B = (B0, . . . , B2g−1). We call this matrix a binary representation of
σ. Then we create a binary matrix B = (B0, . . . ,B2g−1) (also of size 2
g × g) in
the following way. We setB0 = B0. For i = 1, . . . , 2
g−1 we setBi = piBT
i−1
(Bi).
The procedure TraceTrajectories is given in Algorithm 2.
Roughly speaking, the procedure RiffleScrambler(x, s, g, λ) works in the fol-
lowing way.
• For given salt s it calculates a pseudorandom permutation σ (using inverse
Riffle Shuffle), let B be its binary representation.
• It calculates B =TraceTrajectories(B).
• It creates an instance of N -Double-Riffle-Graph (2g+1 rows of 2g vertices)
using BT0 , . . . ,B
T
g−1 as binary words.
• It evaluates x on the graph, calculates values at nodes on last row, i.e.,
v2g+10 , . . . , v
2g−1
2g+1 .
• Last row is rewritten to first one, i.e., v0i = v2g+1i , i = 0, . . . 2g − 1, and
whole evaluation is repeated λ times.
• Finally, the value at v2g2g−1 is returned.
The main procedure RiffleScrambler(x, s, g, λ) for storing a password x using salt
s and memory-hardness parameters g, λ is given in Algorithm 4.
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Example 3. An example of (8, 1)-Double-Riffle-Graph which was obtained from
a permutation σ =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 4 6 3 2 7 0 1
)
. Its binary representation is
the following:
B = (B0, B1, B2), B
T =

 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 00 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

 .
We obtain trajectories of the elements and we can derive words/permutations
for each layer of the graph:
• B0 = B0 = (11100100)T (used in the previous examples) – obtained by
concatenating first digits of elements, we have piB0 =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 5 6 0 1 7 2 3
)
.
• B1 = piBT
0
(B1) = piBT
0
(11100100) = (11000011)T , thus piB1 =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4 5 0 1 2 3 6 7
)
.
• B2 = piBT
1
(B2) = piBT
1
(10010101) = (01011001)T , thus piB2 =
(
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 4 5 1 6 2 3 7
)
.
• Finally,
B = (B0,B1,B2), B
T =

 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 01 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1

 .
The resulting graph is given in Fig. 3.
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(salt dependent)
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
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• • • • • • • •
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v00 v
0
i v
0
i+1 v
0
2g−1
vj0 v
j
2g−1
vj+10 v
j+1
2g−1
v2g0 v
2g
2g−1
input
output
(c) Final graph generated by GenGraph
Figure 3: Instance of (8,1)-Double-Riffle-Graph the graph
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3.1 Pseudocodes
Algorithm 1 RiffleShuffleH(n, s)
1: pi = 〈1, . . . , n〉
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: for j = 1 to i − 1 do
4: M [i, j] = 0
5: end for
6: end for
7: while ∃1≤i≤n∃1≤j<iM [i, j] = 0 do
8: S0,S1 = ∅
9: for w := 1 to n do
10: b = H(s, w, r)1
11: Sb = Sb ⊎ pi[w]
12: end for
13: for i ∈ S0 do
14: for j ∈ S1 do
15: M [max(i, j),min(i, j)] = 1
16: end for
17: end for
18: pi = S0 ⊎ S1
19: end while
20: return pi
Algorithm 2 TraceTrajectories(B)
Require: : B = (B0, . . . , Bg−1) {binary matrix of size 2g ×
g with columns Bi, i = 0, . . . , g − 1}
Ensure: : B {binary matrix of size 2g × g with recalculated trajectories}
1: B0 = B0
2: for i := 1 to g − 1 do
3: Bi = piBT
i−1
(BTi ) //Riffle-Permutation induced by B
T
i
4: end for
5: return B = (B0, . . . ,Bg−1)
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Algorithm 3 GenGraphH(g, σ)
1: N = 2g
2: V = {vji : i = 0, . . . , N − 1; j = 0, . . . , 2g}
3: E = {vji → vji+1 : i = 0, . . . , N − 2; j = 0, . . . , 2g}
4: E = E ∪ {vjn−1 → vj+10 : j = 0, . . . , 2g − 1}
5: Let B be a binary representation of σ
6: Calculate B = (B0, . . . ,Bg−1) =TraceTrajectories(B). Let B2g+1−m =
Bm,m = 0, . . . , g − 2. Let Bj = Bj,0Bj,1 . . .Bj,2g−1
7: for i = 0 to 2g do
8: end for
9: for j = 0 to 2g − 1 do
10: for i = 0 to 2g − 1 do
11: E = E ∪ {vji → vj+1piBj,i} ∪ {v
j
i → vj+1piB¯j,i }
12: end for
13: end for
14: return pi
Algorithm 4 RiffleScrambler(n, x, s, g, λ)
Require: s {Salt}, g {Garlic}, x {Value to Hash}, λ {Depth}, H
{Hash Function}
Ensure: x {Password Hash}
1: σ = RiffleShuffleH(2
g, s)
2: G = (V,E) = GenGraph(g, σ)
3: v00 ← H(x)
4: for i := 1 to 2g − 1 do
5: v0i = H(v
0
i−1)
6: end for
7: for r := 1 to λ do
8: for j := 0 to 2g do
9: for i = 0 to 2g − 1 do
10: vj+1i := 0
11: for all v → vj+1i ∈ E do
12: vj+1i := H(v
j+1
i , v)
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: for i = 0 to 2g − 1 do
17: v0i = v
2g+1
i
18: end for
19: end for
20: x := v2gn−1
21: return x
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4 Proofs
4.1 Proof of Lemma 3
In this Section we present the security proof of our scheme in the sequential
model of adversary. Recall that N = 2g. To prove Lemma 3 it is enough to
prove the following theorem (since then the assertion follows from Theorem 2).
Theorem 5. Let ρ = (ρ0, . . . , ρ2g−1) be a permutation of N = 2
g elements, let
B be its binary representation and letB = (B0, . . . ,Bg−1) =TraceTrajectories(B).
Let G be an N -Double-Riffle-Graph usingB. Then G is an N -Superconcentrator.
Before we proceed to the main part of the proof, we shall introduce some
auxiliary lemmas showing some useful properties of the N -Double-Riffle-Graph.
Lemma 5. Let ρ be a permutation of N = 2g elements, ρ = (ρ0, . . . , ρ2g−1) and
let B be its binary representation. Let B =TraceTrajectories(B). Let G¯ be the
subgraph of N -Double-Riffle-Graph G constructed using B, consisting of g + 1
layers and only of directed edges corresponding to the trajectories defined by ρ.
Then the index of the endpoint of the directed path from jth input vertex v0j of
G¯ is uniquely given by the reversal of the bit sequence BTj . The input vertex v
0
j
corresponds to the output vertex vgk, where k = Bj(2
g − 1) . . .Bj(1)Bj(0).
The above lemma is very closely related to the interpretation of time-reversed
Riffle Shuffle process and it follows from a simple inductive argument. Let us
focus on the last layer of G¯, i.e., the sets of vertices Vg−1 = {vg−10 , . . . , vg−12g−1},
Vg = {vg0 , . . . , vg2g−1} and the edges between them. Let us observe that from
the construction of Riffle-Graph, the vertices from Vg with indices whose binary
representation starts with 1 are connected with the vertices from Vg−1 having
the last bit of their trajectories equal to 1 (the same applies to 0). Applying
this kind of argument iteratively to the preceding layers will lead to the claim.
Let us observe that choosing two different permutations ρ1 and ρ2 of 2
g
elements will determine two different sets of trajectories, each of them leading
to different configurations of output vertices in G¯ connected to respective inputs
from V0 = {v00 , . . . , v02g−1}. Thus, as a simple consequence of Lemma 5 we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. There is one-to-one correspondence between the set Sg2 of per-
mutations of 2g elements determining the trajectories of input vertices in N -
Double-Riffle-Graph and the positions of endpoint vertices from Vg connected
with consecutive input vertices from V0 in the graph G¯ defined in Lemma 5.
In order to provide a pebbling-based argument on memory hardness of the
RiffleScrambler, we need the result on the structure of N -Double-Riffle-Graph
given by the following Lemma 6, which is somewhat similar to that of Lemma 4
from [Bra17].
Lemma 6. Let G be an N -Double-Riffle-Graph with 2g input vertices. Then
there is no such pairs of trajectories that if in some layer 1 ≤ i ≤ g the vertices
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vi−1k and v
i−1
l on that trajectories are connected with some v
i
k′ and v
i
l′ (i.e., they
form a size-1 switch) on the corresponding trajectories, there is no 0 < j < i
such that the predecessors (on a given trajectory) of vi−1k and v
i−1
l are connected
with predecessors of vik′ and v
i
l′ .
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that such two trajectories exist and denote
by v and w the input vertices on that trajectories. For the sake of simplicity we
will denote all the vertices on that trajectories by vi and wi, respectively, where
i denotes the row of G. Let j and k be the rows such that vj , vj+1, wj , wj+1
and vk, vk+1, wk, wk+1 are connected forming two size-1 switches. Without loss
of generality, let j < k. Define the trajectories of v and w as
• Pv = bv0bv1 . . . bvj−1bbvj+1 . . . bvk−1b′bvk+1 . . . bvg and
• Pw = bw0 bw1 . . . bwj−1b¯bwj+1 . . . bwk−1b¯′bwk+1 . . . bwg .
Consider another two trajectories, namely
• P ∗v = bv0bv1 . . . bvj−1b¯bwj+1 . . . bwk−1b¯′bvk+1 . . . bvg and
• P ∗w = bw0 bw1 . . . bwj−1bbvj+1 . . . bvk−1b′bwk+1 . . . bwg .
Clearly, Pv 6= P ∗v and Pw 6= P ∗w. Moreover, one can easily see that Pv and P ∗v
move v0 to vg, Pw and P
∗
w move w
0 to wg. Since other trajectories are not
affected when replacing Pu with P
∗
u for u ∈ {v, w}, such replacement does not
change the order of vertices in gth row. If Pv and Pw differ only on positions
j and k, then Pv = P
∗
w and Pw = P
∗
v , what leads to two different sets of
trajectories resulting in the same correspondence between vertices from rows
0 and g. This contradicts Corollary 1. Otherwise, there exist another two
trajectories Px = P
∗
v and Py = P
∗
w. However, in such situation, from Lemma 5
it follows that x0 and v0 should be moved to the same vertex xg = vg, but this
is not the case (similar holds for y and w). Thus, the resulting contradiction
finishes the proof.
Being equipped with the lemmas introduced above, we can now proceed with
the proof of Theorem 5.
of Theorem 5. We need to show that for every k : 1 ≤ k ≤ G and for every pair
of subsets Vin ⊆ {v00 , . . . , v02g−1} and Vout ⊆ {v2g0 , . . . , v2g2g−1}, where |Vin| =
|Vout| = k there are k vertex-disjoint paths connecting vertices in Vin to the
vertices in Vout.
The reasoning proceeds in a similar vein to the proofs of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 from [Bra17]. Below we present an outline of the main idea of the
proof.
Let us notice that it is enough to show that for any Vin of size k there
exists k vertex-disjoint paths that connect vertices of Vin to the vertices of
Vmiddle ⊆ {vg0 , . . . , vg2g−1} with vertices of Vmiddle forming a line, i.e., either:
• Vmiddle = {vgi , vgi+1, . . . , vgi+k−1} for some i,
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Figure 4: Comparison of the efficiency and security of BalloonHashing (BHG3
is BalloonHashing with δ = 3 and BHG7 is BHG graph for δ = 7), Argon2i,
Catena (with Butterfly graph) and RiffleScrambler (RSG).
• or Vmiddle = {vg0 , . . . , vgi−1} ∪ {vg2g−k+i, . . . , vg2g−1}.
If the above is shown, we obtain the claim by finding vertex-disjoint paths
between Vin and Vmiddle and then from Vmiddle to Vout from the symmetry of
G-Double-Riffle-Graph.
Fix 1 ≤ k ≤ G and let Vin and Vout be some given size-k subsets of input
and output vertices, respectively, as defined above. From Lemma 6 it follows
that if some two vertices x and y are connected in ith round forming a size-1
switch then they will never be connected again until round g. Thus, the paths
from x and y can move according to different bits in that round, hence being
distinguished (they will share no common vertex). Having this in mind, we
can construct the nodes-disjoint paths from Vin to Vmiddle in the following way.
Starting in vertices from Vin, the paths will move through the first t = ⌈log k⌉
rounds according to all distinct t-bits trajectories. Then, after round t, we will
choose some fixed g − t-sequence τ common for all k paths and let them follow
according τ . Lemma 5 implies that the k paths resulting from the construction
described above after g steps will eventually end up in some subset Vmiddle of
k vertices forming a line, whereas Lemma 6 ensures that the paths are vertex-
disjoint.
5 Summary
We presented a new memory hard function which can be used as a secure
password-storing scheme. RiffleScrambler achieves better time-memory trade-
offs than Argon2i and Balloon Hashing when the buffer size n grows and the
number of rounds r is fixed (and the same as Catena-DBG).
On the other hand, in the case of massively-parallel adversaries the situation
of Catena is much worse than RiffleScrambler. In Catena, only double-butterfly
graph (Catena-DBG) offered a time-memory trade-off which depends on the
number of layers of the graph. Unfortunately, Catena-DBG is just a single
graph instance, so in theory an adversary may try to build a parallel hardware
to achieve better trade-off. In the case of RiffleScrambler the time-memory trade-
off is the same as for the Catena-DBG but for RiffleScrambler, a different salt
corresponds (with high probability) to the computation on a different (one from
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N !) graph. So an adversary cannot build just a single device for cracking all
passwords (as in the case of Catena).
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A Markov chains, mixing times, strong station-
ary times
Consider an ergodic Markov chain X = {Xk, k ≥ 0} on a finite state space
E with stationary distribution pi. Ergodicity implies that dTV (L(Xk), pi) → 0
(total variation distance) as k → ∞, where L(Xk) is the distribution of the
chain at step k. Define
τmix(ε) = inf{k : dTV (L(Xk), pi) ≤ ε},
often called total variation mixing time.
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Perfect simulation and strong stationary times. Perfect simulation refers
to the art of converting an algorithm for running a Markov chain into an algo-
rithm which returns an unbiased sample from its stationary distribution. Cou-
pling from the past (CFTP) is one of the most known ones. However, it is not
applicable to our models. Another method is based on strong stationary times
(SSTs), a method whose prime application is studying the rate of convergence
(of a chain to its stationary distribution).
Definition 14. A stopping time is a random variable T ∈ N such that the
event {T = k} depends only on X0, . . . , Xk. A stopping time T is a strong
stationary time (SST) if
∀(i ∈ E)P (Xk = i|T = k) = pi(k).
Due to [AD87],we have
dTV (L(Xk), pi) ≤ Pr(T > k). (1)
Remark 1. An SST T can be non-randomized, i.e., an event {T = k} depends
only on on the path X0, . . . , Xk and does not use any extra randomness (which
is the case for randomized SST). For non-randomized SST performing perfect
simulation is relatively easy: simply run the chain Xk until event T occurs and
stop. Then XT has distribution pi.
Obtaining a random permutation: SST for Riffle Shuffle. In our ap-
plications we will need a random permutation of N elements. We can think of
these elements as of cards, and of a chain on permutations as of card shuffling.
Consider the following shuffling scheme (one step of a corresponding Markov
chain):
For each card in the deck, flip a coin and label the back of the card
with 0 (if Heads occurred) or with 1 (if Tails occurred). Take all
the cards labeled 1 out of the deck and put them on the top keeping
their relative ordering.
This is the inverse Riffle Shuffle. The following rule is an SST for this shuffling
(due to Aldous and Diaconis [AD86]):
Keep track of assigned bits (storing a sequence of assigned bits for
each card). Stop when all the sequences are different.
Once stopped, we have a permutation obtained from exactly uniform distribu-
tion (which is the stationary distribution of this chain). On average, this takes
2 log2N steps. What we considered was an idealized model, in a sense that if we
use some shuffling scheme in cryptography, we do not have an infinite sequence
of random numbers. In reality we must obtain them in a deterministic way, e.g.,
from a private key or a salt (depending on applications). In our constructions,
it depends on some salt s and some hash function H . The Algorithm 1 called
RiffleShuffleH(n, s) takes as input a salt s, a hash function H and the number of
elements n. It performs inverse Riffle Shuffle (with randomness obtained from
salt s and hash function H) until above SST event occurs. Thus, its output is
a random permutation of {1, . . . , n} (in the random-oracle model).
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B Parallel attacks
In this section we formulate lemmas which are used to prove Lemma 4.
These lemmas follow directly the proof of parallel security of Catena pre-
sented in [ABP17]. The proof technique is exactly the same as in [ABP17] since
RSGkλ is a Superconcentrator. The only difference comes from the fact that each
stack of Catena (Butterfly) is built out of 2g− 1 layers while RSGkλ is built from
2g layers. First, let us collect some observations on RSGkλ.
Lemma 7. Let λ, n ∈ N+ such that n = n′(2cλ + 1) where n′ = 2c for some
c ∈ N+. Then the Riffle Shuffle graph RSGkλ consists of a stack λ sub-graphs
such that the following holds.
1. The graph RSGkλ has n nodes in total.
2. The graph RSGkλ is built as a stack of λ sub-graphs {Gi}i∈[λ] each of which
is a Superconcentrator. In the unique topological ordering of RSGkλ denote
the first and final n′ nodes of each Gi as Li,0 and Li,1 respectively. Then
there is a path running through all nodes in each Li,1.
3. Moreover, for any i ∈ [λ] and subsets S ⊂ Li,0 and T ⊂ Li,1 with |S| =
|T | = h ≤ n′ there exist h nodes-disjoint paths p1, . . . , ph of length 2c from
S to T .
Using Lemma 7 and following the proof of Lemma 6 in [ABP17] we obtain
the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let λ, n ∈ N+ be such that n = n′(2λc + 1) with n′ = 2c for some
c ∈ N+. Then it holds that RSGkλ ∈ Dλ,n
′
1,g for g = ⌈
√
n′⌉
The above Lemma 7 together with Theorem 4 imply Lemma 4.
